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In 2004, a scientist from the US Army Medical Research 
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) was potentially 
exposed to a mouse-adapted variant of the Zaire species of 
Ebola virus. The circumstances surrounding the case are 
presented, in addition to an update on historical admissions 
to the medical containment suite at USAMRIID. Research 
facilities contemplating work with pathogens requiring Bio-
safety Level 4 laboratory precautions should be mindful of 
the occupational health issues highlighted in this article.
R
ecent interest and increased investment in biodefense 
research have resulted in construction of new research 
laboratories with Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) capability (1). 
In addition to ensuring biosafety, due consideration should 
be given to managing medical, public health, and public 
relations issues related to occupational exposures to highly 
hazardous infectious pathogens.
We present a potential exposure to Ebola virus that 
occurred in a BSL-4 laboratory at the US Army Medical 
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). 
Background and prior use of the medical containment suite 
(MCS) are reviewed brieﬂ  y, followed by discussion of per-
tinent issues related to the event and recommendations for 
response.
Case Report
In 2004, a virologist at USAMRIID was working in a 
BSL-4 laboratory with mice that had been infected 2 days 
before with a mouse-adapted variant of the Zaire species 
of Ebola virus (ZEBOV) (2). The virulence and infectious 
dose of this variant of ZEBOV are unknown in humans; 
wild-type virus has a case-fatality rate of up to 90% (3).
The person had been following standard procedure, 
holding the mice while injecting them intraperitoneally with 
an immune globulin preparation. While the person was in-
jecting the ﬁ  fth mouse with a hypodermic syringe that had 
been used on previous mice, the animal kicked the syringe, 
causing the needle to pierce the person’s left-hand gloves, 
resulting in a small laceration. The virologist immediately 
squeezed the site to force the extravasation of blood. After 
decontamination of the blue suit in the chemical shower, 
the injured site was irrigated with 1 liter of sterile water and 
then scrubbed with povidone-iodine for 10 minutes.
In terms of exposure risk, the needle was presumed to 
be contaminated with virus-laden blood, although it was 
suspected that low levels of virus were present on the nee-
dle. The animals had not yet manifested signs of infection, 
and much contamination may have been removed mechani-
cally when the needle pierced the gloves. The local decon-
tamination of the site also reduced potential for infection.
USAMRIID medical, scientiﬁ   c, and executive staff 
concluded that the person with potential exposure warrant-
ed quarantine in the MCS. Contact plus airborne precau-
tions (gown, gloves, N95 mask, eye protection) were used, 
with a plan to upgrade to BSL-4 precautions for signs or 
symptoms of illness. These extra precautions were insti-
tuted while the patient was asymptomatic for several rea-
sons: 1) the timing of initial clinical manifestations with 
regard to potential for shedding virus were not known for 
this speciﬁ  c isolate in human infection; 2) there was inter-
est in ensuring all infection control procedures were being 
followed appropriately in advance of clinical illness; and 
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3) there was interest in reducing any potential confounders, 
such as a caregiver transmitting a febrile respiratory infec-
tion to the patient, which might lead to unnecessary pro-
cedures or additional isolation. The person was monitored 
for routine vital signs; daily laboratory studies (coagulation 
studies, blood counts, chemistries, viral isolation, D-dimer) 
and regular physician assessments were performed.
Over the next several days, discussions were held with 
several internationally recognized ﬁ   lovirus experts re-
garding potential treatments or postexposure prophylaxis 
options. Local and state public health ofﬁ  cials were also 
notiﬁ  ed. The consensus opinion was that there was no safe, 
readily available source of immune plasma and little evi-
dence existed to support its use. Emergency investigational 
new drug (IND) protocols were established for treatment 
with recombinant nematode protein (rNAPc2) and antisense 
oligomers, with the intention to consider implementation 
only if the patient demonstrated evidence of infection.
Ultimately, none of the 5 mice had conﬁ  rmed viremia 
at the time of the incident. The patient did not become ill 
or seroconvert and was discharged after 21 days. The story 
received national and local media attention (4,5).
The MCS (“Slammer”)
In planning for USAMRIID (established in 1969), the 
decision was made to include a maximum containment (now 
termed BSL-4) capability to care for 2 personnel who may 
have been exposed to a biologic agent. This MCS would 
also be available for managing occupational exposures at 
USAMRIID or other government agencies to diseases re-
quiring containment (R. McKinney, pers. comm.).
The 1,288-square-foot MCS includes 2 patient rooms 
and a treatment room and is equipped for intensive care mon-
itoring, ventilator use, and teleradiology capability. It has an 
independent ventilation system and a chemical shower for 
decontaminating caregivers’ encapsulating suits (identical 
to those worn in the BSL-4 laboratories), and it is isolated 
from adjacent areas by doors ﬁ  tted with airtight gaskets. This 
latter feature earned the facility the moniker “the slammer,” 
which was popularized in the book The Hot Zone (6).
The MCS is staffed by USAMRIID personnel, with 
augmentation and specialized care provided by nearby 
medical center staff, who serve on a medical augmenta-
tion team (7). Passage of consumables and supplies in and 
out of the suite occurs through 3 conduits: a double-door 
autoclave, an ultraviolet light passbox, and a disinfectant 
dunk tank, which enables decontamination and trans-
port of specimens to external areas within the facility for 
laboratory analysis. The MCS is maintained under nega-
tive pressure. Air undergoes HEPA ﬁ  ltration upon entry 
to and exit from the facility. The septic system links into 
USAMRIID’s laboratory sewer system, which undergoes 
steam sterilization.
Prior MCS Admissions
Twenty-one patients have been considered candidates 
for admission to the MCS (Table 1) (7,8). Eighteen were 
USAMRIID investigators and 3 were from elsewhere. Four 
patients (3, 6, 7, and 18) would likely not be admitted to-
day: 2 involved dengue virus (now a BSL-2 pathogen) and 
1 each involved Japanese encephalitis B virus and Rift Val-
ley fever virus (BSL-3 pathogens with licensed and inves-
tigational vaccines, respectively) (1).
Three patients (6, 7, and 15) were managed in an im-
provised manner. The MCS was unavailable for 1 patient 
because the unit was undergoing maintenance. Thus, the 
observation was conducted in another set of rooms with-
out high-level containment features. Two other patients (16 
and 19) were deemed low risk; consequently, isolation was 
permitted under more conventional conditions.
Of the remaining 14 admissions after potential expo-
sure to BSL-4 viruses, 8 involved percutaneous injury and 
6 involved potential aerosol exposure. Eight persons (5 
evaluated for exposure to Lassa virus, 2 for Machupo virus, 
and 1 for Junin virus) received immune plasma (prepared 
from recovered patients in virus-endemic areas); 1 patient 
potentially exposed to Lassa virus also received intrave-
nous ribavirin. No patient developed disease or serocon-
verted. From 1985 through 2003, no potential exposure in a 
USAMRIID BSL-4 laboratory was deemed a high enough 
risk to require quarantine.
Discussion
Laboratories remain a potential venue for exposures 
to BSL-4 viruses (1). Filoviruses, in particular, have been 
associated with laboratory-acquired infection, being ﬁ  rst 
identiﬁ  ed after exposure to African green monkeys in Mar-
burg, Germany, in 1967 (9). Since then, laboratory-acquired 
Ebola virus infections have occurred in England (10) and 
Côte d’Ivoire (11). The death of a Russian researcher in 
2004 (12) from laboratory-acquired Ebola virus infection 
and USAMRIID’s recent experience demonstrate the seri-
ousness of this issue.
Although USAMRIID periodically manages poten-
tial laboratory exposures (13–16), potential exposures in 
BSL-4 laboratories are rare. Nonetheless, as more facilities 
conduct research on viruses requiring BSL-4 containment, 
cases such as the one presented herein may become more 
commonplace.
The decision to place someone in quarantine is a dif-
ﬁ  cult one. When this potential exposure occurred, several 
alternatives were considered: sending the patient home with 
periodic home or clinic assessments, admission to a medical 
center, and admission to the MCS. Some less serious poten-
tial exposures had been managed with twice-a-day vital sign 
assessments and exclusion from the laboratory. The current 
situation appeared to present a much higher risk to the person 
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than past potential exposures: the patient had a break in the 
skin caused by a potentially contaminated needle, a route of 
infection known to transmit efﬁ  ciently and associated with 
enhanced risk for death (17). Therefore, the most reasonable 
approach was determined to be quarantine in the MCS, thus 
enabling closer monitoring than could be provided at home 
and ensuring the safety of caregivers and family members.
Quarantine in a hospital was considered. This option 
presents certain safety challenges in an unprepared facility, 
including safe handling, transport, and analysis of labora-
tory specimens within the hospital; safe disposal of waste; 
potential reluctance of hospital staff (unfamiliar with viral 
hemorrhagic fevers) to care for such an infected person; 
and lack of a speciﬁ  c area within the hospital conﬁ  gured for 
handling of this type of patient.
There are advantages and disadvantages to using the 
MCS as a stand-alone medical facility. It enables close 
monitoring separate from other patients (thus eliminating 
risk of nosocomial spread and cross-contamination); its 
personnel are already trained in managing a patient in con-
tainment; public access is limited; a proven system is in 
place for waste disposal; and an on-site containment labo-
ratory (with the ability to culture virus or perform sophis-
ticated diagnostic testing under containment conditions) 
reduces risk for infection of clinical laboratory personnel 
and  contamination of laboratory equipment. Disadvan-
tages of a stand-alone facility include lack of ready access 
to consultative physicians; critical care nursing; radiologic 
and other imaging studies; blood products, medications, 
and resuscitative procedures; and other services available 
at a large medical center. Activities undertaken to compen-
sate for these deﬁ  ciencies include stafﬁ  ng the MCS with 
intensive care and infectious disease physicians and having 
other consultants available, as needed. Moreover, ventila-
tor and dialysis machines and blood product and labora-
tory support can be kept on stand-by status within or near 
the facility. However, it is easier to have an isolation unit 
located with or within a major medical center, as has been 
conducted elsewhere (18).
One might question whether a facility such as the MCS 
is the most appropriate place to isolate an infected patient. 
The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
advises that patients with viral hemorrhagic fevers can be 
managed safely in a conventional hospital with, at the most, 
airborne and contact precautions (19–21). Those patients 
with potential exposures (close or high-risk contacts of in-
fected persons) who are not ill should be placed under sur-
veillance with twice-a-day temperature checks, and a pe-
riod of observation is appropriate (19). However, setting(s) 
for this observation period were not speciﬁ  ed. Home ob-
servation works well for potential exposures deemed low 
risk; however, waiting for a patient at higher risk for highly 
hazardous or contagious diseases to manifest fever at home 
is not ideal.
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isolation Virus† Reason for admission  Therapy‡  Comments§
1 1972 Oct  18 Machupo Cut finger  IP
2 1975 Oct  42 Machupo Cut finger  IP, IG 
3 1976 Oct 21 JEB Fingerstick
4 1977 Sep  14 Machupo Vial leak 
5 1977 Sep  14 Machupo Vial leak 
6 1978 May  11 Dengue Not specified  Modified CC 
7 1978 May  8 Dengue Not specified  Modified CC 
8 1978 Jun  17 Lassa Dropped vial  LIG
9 1978 Jun  17 Lassa Dropped vial  LIG
10 1978 Jul  8 Lassa Field exposure 
11 1978 Nov  14 Lassa Suit seam failed 
12 1979 May 20 Lassa Fingerstick IP
13¶ 1979 Jul 21 Lassa Fingerstick IP
14 1979 Nov  20 Lassa Fingerstick IP, Rib 
15 1981 May  14 Ebola/Lassa Field exposure  Modified CC 
16 1982 Oct  14 Junin Defective suit seal  Conventional
17 1982 Dec 21 Junin Fingerstick IP
18 1983 Jan  3 Rift Valley fever  Waste exposure 
19 1983 Apr  14 Junin Defective suit seal  Conventional
20 1985 May 4 Junin Fingerstick
21 2004 Feb 21 Ebola Fingerstick
*Modified from Cieslak et al. (8) with permission. 
†JEB, Japanese encephalitis virus B; Ebola/Lassa, potential exposure to these viruses. 
‡IP, immune plasma from previously infected survivors; IG, immune globulin; LIG, Lassa immune globulin; Rib, ribavirin. 
§CC, containment care; modified CC, provided by converting a separate physical facility into a Biosafety Level 4–like suite; conventional, Biosafety Level 
3 isolation was permitted for 2 lower risk exposures. 
¶Not noted in previous reports (7,8). SYNOPSIS
The MCS was constructed with the premise that cer-
tain rare situations might call for extraordinary precautions 
to isolate victims of severe contagious diseases. These 
precautions reduce risk for a virus such as Ebola being 
introduced into the community by minimizing risk for 
nosocomial spread and optimizing known effective infec-
tion control practices. Although these precautions are use-
ful for ﬁ  loviruses, they may be more useful for other viral 
hemorrhagic fevers that are transmitted more readily by the 
aerosol route or are potentially adaptable to local animal 
reservoirs. The facility may provide some reassurance to 
the community (and thus serve to lessen public anxiety re-
lated to a ﬁ  lovirus exposure) and to laboratory researchers 
that there is a place for their care if they become infected. 
A patient with a ﬁ  lovirus infection in an unprepared medi-
cal facility would be handled as safely as possible, using 
CDC guidelines (if the disease were recognized). It is ac-
knowledged that BSL-4–like infection control precautions 
may not be necessary for observation or illness. However, 
most  clinical experience managing ﬁ  lovirus infections is 
from sub-Saharan Africa, where increased temperature and 
humidity may reduce stability of viruses in aerosol (22). 
Contrast that environment with a US hospital where air is 
cool, dry, and recycled within the facility, a setting poten-
tially more conducive to airborne virus spread.
A laboratory-acquired case of Sabia virus provides 
an example of how a patient infected with a BSL-4 agent 
might be managed safely in a community hospital but 
also provides cause for caution and heightened vigilance, 
especially among facilities that might receive patients 
referred from containment laboratories (23). The Sabia 
virus–infected scientist did not report the initial potential 
exposure and only came to the attention of healthcare pro-
viders after 5 days of illness. He was evaluated initially at 
a tropical medicine clinic and was subsequently referred 
to an emergency department. Although the department 
was notiﬁ  ed that the arriving patient might have been in-
fected with an arenavirus, there was a 12-hour delay be-
fore heightened infection control measures (speciﬁ  c for 
managing a viral hemorrhagic fever patient) were insti-
tuted. A total of 142 persons were identiﬁ  ed as potential 
case-contacts, including 61 workers in the hospital clini-
cal laboratory. Although no secondary cases occurred, 
potential risk and anxiety of contacts, as well as costs 
of an investigation by 3 agencies (CDC, the Connecticut 
Department of Public Health, and Yale University) and a 
6-week period of surveillance, argue in favor of 1) an ag-
gressive program of reporting and evaluating any mishap 
or potential exposure occurring in a containment labora-
tory; 2) use of facilities familiar with and prepared in ad-
vance, when possible, for managing a similar patient; and 
3) a preestablished method for surveillance and site for 
potential quarantine of high-risk exposures.
USAMRIID is not unique in foreseeing the need for a 
special isolation unit. Emory University and the University 
of Nebraska maintain special isolation wards for patients 
with potentially contagious, highly hazardous diseases, and 
recommendations on design and planning for biocontain-
ment patient care units have recently been published (18).
In our recent case, the patient voluntarily entered the 
MCS. Had the patient refused to be quarantined, decision 
and authority on forcible quarantine would have rested 
with local or state health departments. Although there is 
some variability in local and state regulations, authority to 
enforce isolation and quarantine derives from the states’ 
power to “safeguard the health, safety, and welfare of its 
citizens” (24).
There are no approved treatments or postexposure 
prophylaxis regimens for ﬁ  lovirus infections. Use of pas-
sive immunotherapy was considered; however, no studies 
support a deﬁ  nite beneﬁ  t, and no readily available safe 
source of such products exists. On the basis of limited 
data indicating improved survival in rhesus macaques 
challenged with ZEBOV and treated with rNAPc2, an 
emergency IND protocol was obtained for using rNAPc2 
(25). Another emergency IND protocol was obtained for 
use of antisense oligonucleotides on the basis of demon-
strated safety with these compounds for other indications 
(26). Use of either protocol was without proven safety or 
efﬁ  cacy in Ebola virus–infected humans. Both products 
were available for therapeutic use had the patient devel-
oped infection with clinical manifestations that warranted 
aggressive treatment.
Subsequent studies have demonstrated promise for 
treatment of ZEBOV infections with antisense oligonucle-
otides and small interfering RNAs (27,28). An effective 
vaccine would reduce inherent hazards in working with 
these viruses. There have been some recent developments 
with virus-vectored vaccines with and without naked DNA 
vaccine priming (29–31). A phase I human study of such a 
vaccine is ongoing (32).
Management Considerations
Given increasing interest in construction of additional 
laboratories for study of BSL-4 agents, potential exists for 
clinicians to manage an occupational exposure to these vi-
ruses. Our experience led us to formulate a stepwise ap-
proach that might help others plan for and manage similar 
incidents.
Step 1: Prepare
Occupational health clinics associated with contain-
ment laboratories should develop methods of assessing 
need for isolation and laboratory decontamination, exit, 
and notiﬁ  cation procedures. Maintaining a close relation-
ship with the biosafety ofﬁ  ce, thereby knowing the agents 
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in use, will make planning appropriate treatments in ad-
vance easier.
It should be determined in advance where an asymp-
tomatic patient might be observed and where to isolate and 
treat an infected patient. Separate locations may be required, 
but moving an ill patient may be challenging. Thus, memo-
randa of understanding must be established in advance that 
articulate each facility’s role. One should also have 24-hour 
recall rosters of key personnel that are used occasionally.
Step 2:  Assess the Patient
A primary physician should be designated to develop 
the treatment/isolation plan in consultation with other ex-
perts. New diseases or medications need to be queried at 
the time of exposure evaluation if employees did not previ-
ously notify occupational health ofﬁ  cials. This information 
must be gathered in a nonpunitive environment so that re-
porting of potential exposures is not discouraged. Details of 
the exposure incident should be obtained from the patient, 
the patient’s supervisor, department chief, and laboratory 
co-workers.
Risks for exposure and disease should be estimated 
with available information as reported (13,14). Care for 
family members, including children, the elderly, or pets, 
may need to be addressed, in addition to issues such as 
powers of attorney, advanced directives, last wills and tes-
taments, and similar legal matters.
Step 3: Gather Appropriate Consultants and Team
Designating another person to coordinate other activi-
ties surrounding a high-proﬁ  le exposure (arranging confer-
ences with external experts, handling media inquiries, issu-
ing press releases, and interacting with external agencies) 
frees the primary physician to care for the patient. For any 
clinically important exposures, especially in the absence 
of licensed therapeutics, it is appropriate to seek advice of 
consultants (Table 2). These persons may vary, depending 
on the organization, the pathogen in question, and individ-
ual expertise.
Local and state public health agencies will need to be 
part of discussions if there is potential public health impact; 
these organizations will likely be ﬁ  elding queries from the 
public and the press simultaneously. Local hospitals should 
be informed if there is potential for transferring the pa-
tient to those facilities. The Food and Drug Administration 
should be informed if establishment of an emergency use 
IND is contemplated. Any laboratory that might test clini-
cal samples should also be informed in advance of speci-
mens arriving.
Step 4: Determine the Appropriate 
Level of Infection Control Measures
Although specialized containment care procedures and 
facilities may play a limited role in certain extraordinary 
cases, such as those discussed here, CDC has published 
guidance for management of viral hemorrhagic fevers in 
more conventional settings (19–21). Standard, contact, and 
droplet precautions and a private room are recommended in 
initial outpatient or inpatient assessments in early stages of 
illness, and a face mask should be placed on patients with 
respiratory symptoms. A room capable of airborne isolation 
should be considered early to prevent later need for trans-
fer. Precautions should be upgraded to airborne isolation 
if a prominent cough, vomiting, diarrhea, or hemorrhage 
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Table 2. Consultants to consider for establishing a team to manage a potential laboratory exposure 
Consultant no.  Title and description 
1 Designated primary physician 
2 Scientific expert: This person knows the latest medical/scientific literature on the organism. 
3 Director of safety: This person will assess the mechanism of injury and how to avoid a repeated occurrence. 
4 Research institute or laboratory director’s representative: This person may serve as the liaison to external political, 
media, or scientific agencies and will need to be aware of the progress of the patient or any investigation to convey 
accurate information externally and internally. 
5 Patient’s supervisor or department chief: This person will need to reassess the specific laboratory methods used (in 
conjunction with safety) and modify procedures as needed. 
6 Representative from regulatory affairs: This person may serve as a liaison to regulatory agencies such as the Food 
and Drug Administration, especially if establishing an emergency investigational new drug protocol is contemplated. 
7 Public affairs representative: This person needs accurate information to hold press briefings or to generate press 
releases.
8 Occupational health representative: This person should work in conjunction with safety experts to analyze the 
mechanism of exposure and ways to prevent a recurrence. 
9 Scribe: This person will keep track of the key contacts and decisions, as well as the different courses of action 
considered.
10 Patient: In many cases, the patient may be the most well-informed person on the specific pathogen. His or her level 
of expertise and interest will determine whether to include the patient in group discussions. If the patient is already 
in isolation, a family representative may be considered to participate in group discussions with the patient’s 
approval. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act* privacy regulations still apply. 
*Public Law 104-191 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, August 21, 1996 [cited 2007 Aug 27]. Available from 
www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa SYNOPSIS
develop in a patient, or if the patient undergoes procedures 
that may stimulate coughing or generation of aerosols.
Step 5: Provide Additional Communications
Because ﬁ  lovirus exposure has a particular cachet and 
media interest may be intense, it is preferable to inform the 
media proactively. Public affairs personnel will need to de-
velop press releases and arrange interviews in conjunction 
with a medical or scientiﬁ  c expert. Lessons can be learned 
from the negative publicity received after the tularemia ex-
posures at Boston University (33,34) and the death of the 
Russian researcher from infection with Ebola virus (12) af-
ter a delay in disseminating that information.
Regular communication with the laboratory’s work-
force should be maintained. Medical care personnel also 
need regular updates on modiﬁ  cations of procedures and 
ongoing reemphasis of infection control practices.
Step 6: Conduct Appropriate Isolation Logistics
A patient in quarantine results in logistical challeng-
es (providing food and equipment and decontaminating 
personal, medical, and food waste) even before illness 
develops. CDC provides recommendations for specimen 
handling of viral hemorrhagic fever patients (19–21) that 
include 1) minimizing laboratory procedures, 2) alerting the 
laboratory of the nature of the specimens, 3) transporting 
specimens in decontaminated leak-proof plastic containers, 
4) processing laboratory specimens in a class II biologic 
safety cabinet with BSL-3 practices, and 5) performing vi-
rus isolation or culture in a BSL-4 laboratory. If possible, 
CDC recommends pretreatment of serum specimens with 
heat (56°C) combined with polyethylene glycol p-tert-oc-
tylphenyl ether (Triton X-100) at a concentration of 10 μL/
mL of serum to reduce viral titer; however, 100% inactiva-
tion may not occur (21). Automated analyzers should be 
cleaned and disinfected according to manufacture recom-
mendations or with sodium hypochlorite at a concentration 
of 500 ppm (1:100 dilution) (20,21).
One should also limit the number of staff performing 
24-hour monitoring and establish restricted room access 
and an entry-tracking log. If the patient becomes ill, some 
staff who entered the room may require illness surveillance, 
especially if there were any breaches in infection control 
practices. A visitation policy may need to be addressed. 
Because spending weeks in quarantine can be particularly 
stressful for the patient, it is useful to consider ways to keep 
the patient occupied, such as Internet connectivity, a televi-
sion/video player, and a telephone.
Step 7: Decide on Treatment
Decisions on treatment/prophylaxis are difﬁ  cult for vi-
ruses requiring BSL-4 precautions that lack any licensed 
therapy or prophylaxis. Therefore, having access to subject 
matter experts (as discussed in step 3) is essential. Collec-
tively, difﬁ  cult treatment decisions may be required that 
balance risk from investigational therapies against pre-
sumed risk for disease.
Step 8: Keep a Journal
Designation of a scribe early on should be considered 
to track major events, decision points, and options that 
were considered. Records of dates and times of important 
contacts should be included. Meeting minutes should be 
generated. Maintaining accurate logs may be useful to de-
fend difﬁ  cult decisions later and may help drive an after-
action review.
Step 9: Learn from the Experience
It is useful to conduct a formal incident review that as-
sesses how the event was managed. Results from any safety 
or epidemiologic investigations should be included. With 
appropriate review of procedures and training, additional 
potential exposures may be prevented.
Conclusions
There are few institutions in the United States current-
ly capable of working with viruses that require BSL-4 con-
tainment, although the list is expected to expand in the near 
future. This article highlights medical issues and provides 
management considerations on the basis of USAMRIID’s 
experience related to a recent potential exposure to a ﬁ  lovi-
rus. The expectation is that as other facilities contemplate 
conducting research with BSL-4 pathogens, this report may 
enable them to improve their preparation for potential ex-
posures in the future.
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